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STATE112IJT OF SEHATOR MIKE MAHSFIELD (D . , f.10IlTANA) 
NUClEAR TEST BAU TREATY 
Mr. President: 
For several Heeks, the Senate has had the proposed Treaty on 
Nuclear Testing. The question has been examined intensively not only by 
the Committee on Foreign Relations but also by members of the Armed Services 
Committee and the Senate members of the Committee on Atomic Energy, all of 
,.,hom l·rere invited to participate in the hearings . 
There has been in process, in short, a very thorough Senate con-
sideration of the proposed Treaty. The specific questions have already 
been asked and ansHered, as far as it has been possible to answer them. 
The specific doubts have been raised and, as far as possible, laid to rest~ 
We are novr approaching a point at which ,.,e must put the penultimate 
question in solitary conscience . It is this decision '1-rhich will produce the 
final vote by '·rhich the Senate ,.,ill either give or '\·rithhold consent to rati-
fication of the proposed Treaty. 
The issue nov is not '1-rhether Germany mistrusts the Treaty or 
France mistrusts it more or Communist China most of all . 
The issue, no~.v-, is not solely the meaning of the Treaty for health 
and human genetics, or for ~ilitary strategy or for the technology and costs 
of scientific arms-competition. 
All these issues and others have been considered in the painstak-
ing interrogation of the past few weeks . Each has its own unique signi-
ficance. But each is a fragment of the penultimate question and must be 
so regarded if we are to reach sound decision. 
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For the quertion which now confronts us is the one question which 
is the sum of the many questions . And a rational response to it can only . 
be the sum of the many responses, weighed in the scale of such wisdom and 
judgment as each of us may possess. The attitude of no single expert or 
group of experts in or out of government, no single official or group of 
officials of this government, no single scientist or group of scientists 
can be controlling on this question. The question is for us alone to decide. 
It is not for any_ sciP.ntist, military; leader, cabinet secretary or ,.,hatever 
to decide for us. It remains nm1 for elected Senators to decide for them-
selves, to confirm or refuse to confirm the judgment of an elected President. 
This penult~ate question which confronts us is simply stated: 
Does the Pl~posed Treaty serve, on balance, the interests of the people 
of the United States, when those interests are considered in their totality1 
Or to put it negatively: Is the proposed Treaty, on balance, in~cal to 
the interests of the people of the United .states? 
If it is inimical, obviously, the President should not have had . 
the Treaty signed in the first place and, certainly, the Senate should oot 
now con~ent to its ratification. But if the Troaty passes even a minimal 
test, if reason tells us that, on balance, the Treaty is not inimical to 
this nation, then that alone 'muld seem to be sufficient grounds for 
approving it. For if we mean what we say when we speak of supporting the 
leadership of the President, irrespective of party, in his great national 
responsibilities in foreign relations, we must mean, at least, that in 
matters of this kind, we are inclined to give him thQ benefit of thOGe 
vague and residual. hesitancies by which each o£ us in his own way may be 
possessed. 
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And may I aQd, Mr . President, that I do not see how any Senator 
can vote either for or against this Treaty uith a sense of absolute assurance. 
In any ma.jor essay in forei~m relations there are bound to be hesitancies . 
They would be there if we debated the proposed Treaty or any ma.jor issue, a 
month, a year or a decade. 
There ,.,ere doubts and hesitancies "\-Then a Republican Congress voted 
a Marshall Plan under a Democratic President. There "'ere doubts and hesi-
tancies when a Democratic Congress voted a Middle East Resolution under a 
Republican President . The doubts are there year in and year out when Con-
gress considers the foreign aid program. For the simple truth is that there 
are no certainties, no absolutes in significant matters of foreign relations . 
Indeed, were there no doubts on this question of a nuclear test 
ban that in itself ,.,ould be cause for the deepest concern. For the absence 
of any doubt would suggest either a dangerous delusion or an insipid in-
significance in the Treaty. 
The truth is that there are risks in this as in any venture in 
foreign relations. But I remind the Senate that there are also risks in 
failing to venture, in standing still in a world which does not stand still 
for us or any nation. And at this moment in the world's time, the risks of 
a paralyzed uncertainty may be far greater than those which might stem from 
the pursuit of this venture . 
Indeed, there is a strong presumption that such must be the case . 
I say that, Mr . Pr esident, because this proposed Treaty is no instant fancy, 
no sudden concoction . \ole have not arrived in haste at this point of de-
cision. The active pursuit of a Treaty to ban nuclear tests began many 
years ago under the Administration of President Eisenhower . The previous 
admimstration was not passive and negative in its approach. It sought a 
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treaty in a most active and positive fashion . Indeed, the former Vice 
President journeyed to Hoscm·r in 1959 in an effort to further this objec-
tive, among others, of United States foreign policy. And in a letter 
dated April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower vrrote Mr . Khrushchev that: 
"The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance 
of nuclear weapons tests." Note, Mr. President, the phrase "strongly seeks." 
In short, t·1r . President, the search for a nuclear test ban treaty 
was clearly a cardinal element in the foreign policy of the nation during 
the second Eisenhower Administration. \·Then r.u-. Kennedy assumed office, he 
did not have to continue that search. He could have abandoned it. He could 
have ignored the efforts of the previous Administration. He could have 
turned his back on the affirmations in favor of a nuclear test ban treaty, 
as they were contained in the platforos of both parties during the 196o 
Presidential campaign and upon which Mr. Kennedy and Mr . Hixon stood for 
office. That is a prerogative of the Presidency and Mr. Kennedy could have 
exercised it had he judged, after a full examination of relevant information, 
that the policy was detrimental to the interests of the nation. 
But Mr . Kennedy did not so find . On the contrary, he pursued 
the matter even as Mr . Eisenhower had done before him. And he continued 
to pursue it, in spite of repeated set-backs and frustrations not unlike 
those undergone by his predecessor, until an agreement vms, at last, 
initialed by his distinguished agent, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. 
Averell Harriman on July 25, 1963. That agreement, I would note in order 
to emphasize its non-partisan nature, is more closely in accord with the 
concept of a nuclear test ban as it is contained in the Republican Party's 
Presidential Platform in 196o than it is with the similar plank in the 
Democratic Party's Platform. 
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It is conceivable that one President of the United States may 
have misjudged the American interest in this highly significant matter 
although I do not for a moment suggest that such was the case with 
President Eisenhower. But I find it most difficult to believe that two 
Presidents in succession would be guilty of neg1igence or poor judgment 
on precisely the same question of national interest . No, Mr. President, 
there is a strong presumption that a test ban treaty is not only not 
inimiial to the interests of the people of the nation but is to their 
positive advantage. 
Further, Mr. President, when members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Committee on Armed Services and the Senate members of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy probe every word, comma and period of the 
text of the Tre~ty, when they examine every conceivable implication of the 
Treaty for days on end, when they hear countless relevant witnesses of the 
Executive Branch, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and 
the Director of the C. I.A . give sober but unmistakable support for this 
Treaty, when the committees summon for testimony not only the advocates 
of this Treaty but its most articulate competent opponents--in short, 
11hen the treaty is subjected to the most stringent Senate Committee scrutiny 
and the great preponderance of informed testimony is favorable, there is a 
strong presumption that the Treaty is in the positive interests of the 
United States . 
And yet, t4r . President, a strong presumption is not enough in a 
matter of this kind. Each Senator has an individual responsibility to 
examine this Treaty for himself in the light of his own conscience and 
his o1vn concept of the interests of his state and the nation. 
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The Senator from Montana has done so . And having done so, he 
is persuaded that the proposed Treaty does no violence to but, on the 
contrary, serves the interests of the people of his state and the nation. 
It serves those interests, immediately and tanaibly, in matters 
of public health as they may involve a resident or a child yet to be ~ 
in Montana or in anyone of the fifty states. I refer, Mr. President, to 
the question of radiation which, as an uninvited but ever-present specta-
tor, has haunted these hearin~s of the last few weeks. To be sure, there 
may be a lack of certainty among scientists and doctors on the precise 
effects of can-made radiation on health end the human species . But let 
there be no mistake about it. There is a minimal concept of the dangers 
of radiation from which reputable scientific and medical opinion does not 
depart . It is expressed very clearly in the unanimous report of the 
United Nations Scientific Comm:i.ttee on the Facta of Atomic Radiation, 
17th Session of the General Assembly, 1962. In this report, scientists 
from 15 nations, including France, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada recorded their unanimous agreement 
that: 
"The exposure of mankind to radiation from increasing 
numbers of artificial sources including the worldwide 
contamination of the environment with short and long-
lived radio-nuclides from weapons tests calls for the 
closest attention particularly because the effects of 
any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully 
manifested for several decades in the case of somatic 
disease and for many generations in the case of genetic 
damage . There should be no misunderstanding about the 
reality of genetic damage from radiation . The Committee 
therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unneces-
sary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided 
entirely, particularly when the exposure of large popula-
tions is entailed . " 
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~~. President, so far as I am aware, that statement has not been 
challenged from a reputable medical or scientific source anywhere in the 
world. It is a most conservative statement and one must question the 
sobriety of anyone who would pass off the factor of radiation damage as 
irrelevant or propagandistic in the consideration of the proposed Treaty. 
It is of central importance. For what the statement says, in effect, is 
that we do not knmr precisely hovr harmful man-made radioactivity is but 
we are certain that it is not good for human health or for the genetics 
of the human race . It is not good, in short, for men, ,.,omen and children--
and particularly children--in Montana,. Arizona, Ohio, ~o/ashington, Nevada, 
Hississippi, Utah, or Missouri anymore than in London, Paris, Moscow, 
Peking or Tokyo. t·lhat the statement says, in effect, is that radiological 
technicians in hospitals do not w·ear heavy protective clothing and dentists 
do not shelter themselves for the fun of it vrhen they take X-rays . They do 
so because the stuff of X-rays, as of nuclear bomb tests, is insidiously 
dangerous . What the statement says, in effect, is that it is highly in-
advisable to put even minute quantities of strontium 90 or 89 into milk 
or to add other radioactive isotopes such as Iodine 131 or Cesium-137 to 
bread, as though they were vitamin A, B, C, or D. They are quite the re-
verse in their effect on human health and on the human species . The state-
ment says, in short, handle man-made radioactivity with extreme care or, 
preferably, do not handle it at all . 
Yet we have been compelling our own people to handle it as vrell 
as the Russian people and others, and the Russians have been compelling 
their people as well as ours and oih ers to handle it. That has been the 
consequence of bomb tests because, beyond the radiation released in proximity 
to a test site.1 the phenomenon of' f'al~out results in a wide distribution 
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throughout the world from each detonation wherever it may occur . And 
radioactivity is both ideologically neutral and wholly indifferent to 
national boundaries . When carried in the air-currents and clouds of the 
atmosphere it places free peoples, Communist peoples or whatever, all on 
this :planet, in the same radioactive boat . 
\·Te will find some scientif'ic voices saying that it is not too 
bad and very temporary, this thing which has already been done by nuclear 
bomb tests to the planetary setting in which all human life is lived . We 
will find some scientific opinion which takes the opposite view, that the 
genetic damage already done has been very substantial . And we will find 
many scientists who say so far it is not too bad but "'e had better avoid 
much more . That there are these differences is a reflection not so much 
of a disagreement on the facts but of a paucity of facts and of differing 
values which are put on the integrity of the individual human life . Some 
are more prepared than others, apparently, to sacrifice this integrity on 
the altar of science for what is regarded as a valid scientific or defense 
purpose . 
In terms of statistics, our own Federal Radiation Council has 
made some estimates of the human costs of the radioactive by-products of 
nuclear bomb t ests . The figures which it supplies are exclusive of the 
effects of the last Russian test- series of super-bombs in 1962. The 
Council indicates that all tests in the United States and throughout the 
world through 1961 could produce in this nation in this and future genera-
tions anywhere up to 15,000 cases of gross physical and mental birth de-
fects and, possibly, up to a maximum of 2,000 leukemia cases and up to a 
maximum of 700 cases of bone cancer l.rithin the next 70 years . Other 
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adverse health effects of these tests, as, for example, those of radioactive 
iodine 131 to children's thyroids in the vicinity of tests sites in the 
mountain states of the West, are strongly suspect. The same is true of 
Cesium 137 which has been delivered in heavy ~uantities to Eskimos in 
Alaska as a result of Soviet tests in the Arctic. 
Still other ill-effects cannot even be guessed at, as for example, 
those of Carbon 14 which has a radioactive life of several thousand years 
and may be said, therefore, to have already altered the human environment 
permanently. 
It is all very well to note that the stati~tical projections 
suggest only a very small number of Americans as adversely affected by 
all tests throughout the world through 1961. But it would not be very 
well to tell thet to the specific Americans who will suffer the conse-
quences . Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian test series of 1962 
will add to the specific totals ~f health damage already projected in the 
United States . It is clear, too, that any additional tests in the atmos-
phere by the Soviet Union, the United Sta·~s or any other eountry will do 
the same and, in the absence of a treaty, the addition to the totals can 
be large or small depending upon the whim and the capacity not only of 
ourselves but of the Soviet Union or any other nation. 
It is clear, in short, that hovrever small the effects appear to 
be in the statistical computation, nuclear bomb-testing has already caused 
a damage to human health and, potentially, its continuance is a great 
danger to human health . It is so clear that it can be said in this Senate 
that ,.,e will not find one reputable scientific voice which will advocate 
the continuance of bomb tests on the grounds that they are a kind of fillip 
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for human health or a genetic stimulant for the improvement of the human 
species. 
Therefore, the fundamental, if unspoken, assumption of the Treaty 
must be that neither this nation nor the Soviet Union seeks the dubious 
distinction ~f being the foremost contaminator of the earth's physical 
environment with radioactive substances. It is the assumption that the 
Russians are at least rational enough and human enough to be concerned with 
this menace to the health of their children and their grandchildren as we 
are with respect to ours. 
Those may be erroneous assumptions. It may be, I suppose, that 
the Russians are so obsessed with being first that it is all the same to 
them whether the race has to do ,.,i th the Olympic Games, the moon, economic 
growth, the ballet or radioactive contamination. It may be that this 
obsession is so strong that they are prepared to sacrifice even their 
progeny to it. 
Ev~_if it were so, even if the Russians were indifferent to 
the pollution of their own place, along with every other nation's place, 
in the earth's environment, then all it would signify is that this Treaty 
has little meaning. It would signify that the Treaty ,.,111 not do much 
good. But, then, with the safeguards which are Erovided and assured, 
neither will it do much harm. 
For what would happen, Mr. President, if we ventured on the 
assumption that the Russians did not wish to menace the health of their 
own people anymore than we and events proved us wrong? At some point in 
the future, then, the Russians would resume atmospheric and marine testing. 
But would they not be able to do that in any event in the absence of a 
Treaty? What is to stop t.bem? And i.f they resume this dubious process 
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of denaturizing the physical environment of mankind 1.rhat is to stop us from 
joinins in this macabre competition once again~ Not this Treaty, Mr. Presi-
dent. There is nothing in this Treaty vrhich would stop us in those circum-
stances . And it has been made very clear in the hearings that we intend to 
rejoin this competition on very short notice if it is forced upon us . 
ITo, t·1r . President, if there is any safe assumption in this Treaty, 
it is that there is an absolute mutual interest--that of the preservation 
of human health--which applies to every nation on this globe . This common 
interest vrill either be pursued in good faith by all nations--especially 
by the United States and the Soviet Union- -or all will suffer the conse-
quences of the failure to do so . There is no escape . There is no way, 
neither sneak nor open, to gain an advantage in this matter of health--
not for us, not for the Soviet Union, not for any nation. For the simple 
fact is that if there are no atmospheric tests, the geiger counters vTill 
taper their rhythms everY'·There . If there are tests, the counters will 
click their warning to human health in every part of the world. 
To be sure, Mr . President, there are other nations--France and 
China in particular--which, health factors notwithstanding, have already 
announced that they will not adhere to this Treaty. Such states will re-
main lesally free to test nuclear weapons in any other environment. But 
uithout this Treaty such HOuld still be the case . Even at worst, these 
countries cannot conceivably pose, for many years, anything remotely 
resembling the kind of threat to human health which is implicit in a 
resumption of unrestricted nuclear testing by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. With the Treaty effectively maintained betvreen the United 
States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, we will have at least a 
period of respite which, in itself, Hill be of some worldwide health benefit . 
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And with the adherence of the great bulk of the civilized nations of the 
world- - over 8o nations have already signed the agreement--there will be 
an opportunity for a vigorous and concerted search for additional ways to 
make the Treaty universal in its application. 
r~ . President, let me emphasize that there are no grounds for 
sanguine expectations that this Treaty, even if it is ratified by this 
nation will bring an end to the more dangerous types of nuclear testing. 
It is a tangible hope; that is all . But against that tangible hope there 
is certain dispair.. In the absence of this Treaty, the process of radio-
active contamination of the environment by bomb tests 1-rill continue and in 
all probability intensify. Past experience indicates that deploring these 
tests in speeches and party platforms will not end them. Introducing 
Senate r esolutions against them will not prevent them. Passin~ resolutions 
in the U.N. General Assembly will not inhibit them. Voluntary moratoriums 
will not stop them . All these expediencies, short of a treaty, have been 
tried and they have not succeeded. The inescapable fact remains that a 
total anarchy in this critical matter still exists in the >·rorld. The in-
escapable fact is that not only this nation but every nation is still com-
pletely free at this moment to wreak damage not only on its o~m heritage 
of the earth's environment but on that of every other people. And the 
inescapable fact is that the fear of losing a technological military ad-
vantage or the hope of gaining one- -this terrifying fear and this elusive 
hope--which in the past, have impelled the Russians no less than ourselves 
to overlook the hazards to human health in these tests ''ill almost cer-
tainly compel us to do the same in the future . We shall be so impelled, 
and they shall be so impelled, unless this Treaty enters into force and 
is scrupulously maintained on both sides. The likelihood- -1 venture to 
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say, the certainty--is that without this Treaty, the dangers to the health 
of all Americans, of all human beings, from bomb-made radioactivity, will 
multiply. lleither an embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled evasion of 
experience and fact changes the reality one iota. 
Even if the Treaty com~s into force, it is obvious that this 
Treaty, in itself, will not halt the continuing and intense scientific and 
technological competition to gain a military advantage or to avoid losing 
one. That will go on for the present on both sides, as is very apparent 
from the Senate hearings and from statements emanating from Moscow. But 
,;hat the Treaty does do is to put a muzzle on one aspect of thut competi-
tion. Hhat the Treaty does do is to force the competition, insofar as it 
is no"' dependent on nuclear testing on both sides, out of the atmosphere 
and from the seas and on·;,;o the design boards and into the factories and 
beneath the ground. 
The Treaty mo.y not \Tork, Mr. President . It mo.y be cheated or 
frightened or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned into discard, quickly 
or in time. It may be, in the end, no more effective than the voluntary 
moratoriums and the resolutions or whatever of the past. And the world 
will go on deploring these tests even as they multiply. 
I hope no Senator will vote for ratification of this Treaty on 
the mistaken belief that it is a guarantee that bomb tests will now cease 
for all times. The truth is that in voting for ratification of this Treaty, 
as I have already stated, "''e will be voting for a hope. But let me stress, 
rrr . President, that it is a significant, a tangible hope . 
And so long as that hope, that tangible hope is present, the 
Senator from !·1ontana is not going to tell the people of his state, that 
he voted to dash it, to kill it. He is not going to tell the people \rhom 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 76, Folder 24, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 14 -
he represents that President Kennedy brought this hope, first raised under 
President Eisenhower, to binding treaty form--this hope that there will no 
longer be avoidable increases in the incidence of leukemia, bone cancer, 
~d cancer, birth malformations and other radiologically induced de-
ficiencies among Hontanans and Americans and all human beings- -but, for a 
variety of reasons, he could not support the President. The Senator from 
Montana is not going to say that he could not support the President because 
the French government or the Chinese Communist government did not like the 
Treaty. Nor will he say it because a prominent scientist out of a large 
number of prominent scientists registered the very unscientific fiat of 
his own oPinion that ·the Treaty vre.s a dreadful tragic mistake. Nor vrill 
he say it because he is convinced that in a wasteful spending competition 
on armaments, our taxpayers can outspend the Russians, spend them into 
bankruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves. 
Nor will he say it because the statistical evidence showed 
only a few Americans would die before their time or only a few American 
children would be born malformed because of tests already conducted. Nor 
will he say it because the Treaty might also be signed by East Germany ann 
he would much rather that the East Germans begin testing nuclear bombs than 
that even the remotest suggestion be given that the United States had, by 
getting into the same treaty, somehow recognized the existence of this 
East German regime. 
Nor will he say it because he believes that Russians, who most 
certainly cannot be trusted in many things cannot be trusted even to cease 
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denaturizing their o~m environ~ent along with ours and everyone else's on 
earth. 
No, Mr . President, the Senator from Montana is not going to tell 
l·iontaoans that he opposed this Treaty on any of these grounds . Yet all 
have been advanced at one time or another in the past weeks as grounds for 
rejecting this Treaty. 
There is one ground--one ground alone--on which the Senator from 
Montana would be prepared to go home and tell the people vrho sent him to 
Hashington, that these tests in the atmosphere and in the seas must go on 
despite t!1e great potentlal threat of' their continuance to their health 
and to their children's health. 
He would not make light of these health risks or pass over them 
but he would ask his constituents to accept them in all their grim portent 
because he vra.s persuaded that this Treaty would expose the natj.on, to a 
greater extent than w·e now are, to a military attack which Hould destroy 
both the meaning and much of the substance of' the life which we have built . 
He vrould not ask them to accept the hPalth risks of' indiscriminate 
and uncontrolled nuclear testing if all he had vras a personal surmise that 
the risks of military attack would increase, if all he had were vague per-
sonal doubts and hesitancies in the face of a new course . To ask them to 
accept the health risks he would have to find in the total record1 speci-
fics for concluding that the risks of military attack would be significantly 
increased by our adherence to this Treaty. He would have to find, in speci-
fics , affirmative answers to these questions: 
1. Is there some nation, other than the Soviet Union--Communist 
China, for example--wtich, by not adhering to this Treaty, is likely to 
develop a nuclear technology which will approximate ours in the next decade, 
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another nation •ihich could close the nuclear gap solely because it tested 
and we did not? The ans~er is no. 
2 . If the Soviet Union, then, is the one nation which poses a 
nuclear threat to the United States in the next decade or more, has that 
nation already achieved a substantial advantage, on balance, over the 
United States in the military technology derived from nuclear physics--the 
kind of advantage which we might neutralize by a continuance of above-
ground tests on our side even though they also continued to improve their 
te~hniques through such testing on their side? The answer, insofar as it 
is possible to answer the question, on the basis of fact, knowledge and 
the over,rhelming judgment of the most highly skilled and qualified witnesses 
in the nation is no. 
3· Is there any reason to assume that our advances in nuclear 
science and its application to military technology will be hampered to a 
greater degree than that of the Soviet Union, in the complete absence of 
atmospheric and marine tests on both sides? The answer is no. 
4. By the terms of this Treaty, will the Soviet Union be legally 
authorized to do anything which we are not also authorized to do? The 
answer is no . 
5· By the terms of this Treaty are we legally forbidden to do 
anything which the Soviet Union is not legally forbidden to do? The 
answer is no . 
6. Is there any other than the most remote possibility that the 
Soviet Union could engage in prohibited but significant tests without de-
tection? The answer is no . 
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7. If the Soviet Union were to engage in a clandestine test 
and if it were identified or if we had very valid reason to believe that 
such a test had occurred even if not identified, would we ourselves still 
be bound to forego a resumption in testing above ground? The answer is no. 
8. Is there a significant possibility that a single Soviet test 
suddenly sprung upon us could so alter the balance of military forces 
between the two nations as to increase the risk of military attack upon us. 
The answer is no. 
In short, the answer to every ~pecific doubt which involves the 
possibility of the Soviet Union or any n3tion g~ining same unique or sig-
nificant military advantage as against o~rselves in this Treaty is not 
yes but no. And because it is no, I cannot in good conscience ask any 
citizen of Montana to accept the heightened risks to the health of their 
families which will be inevitable in the absence of the ratification of 
this Treaty by the United States. 
If there are not specific grounds of unigue disadvantage to the 
military defense of the nation for rejecting this Treaty, what other 
grounds can there be? One detects in the few articulate opponents of this 
Treaty, a consistent theme which suggests a basis for the remaining doubts 
and hesitancies. It is, apparently, the belief that our scientific-milita~ 
complex is so superior to all others that if not subjected to any limitation 
as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in military-nuclear 
technology . The ccmplex, it is suggested, will achieve some incredible 
breakthrough so as to widen, once and for all, the gap as between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union . That the Soviet Union, of course, in the absence of 
a testing_limitation, wi~also be free to seek a similar breakthrough 
i 
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is either overlookec'i. or regarded of little consegue:'lce. That there are 
dangers to health in the continuing process of uncontrolled testing by 
both sides, of c~urse, is either overlooked or regarded as of little 
consequence . 
~~. President, I have the highest respect for our n~clear 
physics, our industrial technology, our military leadership and our 
capacity to merge them into a powerful complex for the purpose of the 
nation's defense. This complex is second to none in the world. But 
admiration and respect for these capacities do not and must never compel 
the elected offic]als of this Dr•.ticn to accept the dictum of this complex 
as to what is best for the people of the United States. 
The ffl.ct is that this Treaty '¥'ill introduce no curbs upon the 
crea.ti vi ty and d;y-.aa.!llism of the complex which are not also placed equall.y 
upon such complexes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world. That 
men of scientific genius or highly developed technolo~ical specialization 
may find such curbs irkscme or burdensome is understandable. Fut there 
is too much at stake here, for the nation and for the world, for the 
Senate to be persuaued by individual considerations of that kind. 
Indeed, reason and experience must lead us to question most 
seriously the course of policy which flows from such considerations. It 
is the course which assumes that if we will only continue to debar any 
restraints on testing, if we will only continue to throw considerations 
of public health to the winds, our scientists and our technicians will 
create that decisive nuclear ~a]J that ultimate military gap, which will 
insure the nation's security. 
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Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since 
the first at01aic bombs in the New Mexico flats and over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki? What restraints, indeed, what reins have been placed on the 
full exploration of this immense power of nuclear destructio~ in all these 
years? Uot those of money, to be sure . Not those of a ban on testing, 
to be s<l!'e . Through all these years since \olorld vlar II there has been 
no treaty to bar nuclear tests of any kind. We have tested again and 
again. ~ne Russians have done the same. 
And what has happened, Mr. President? We began in 1945 with 
the atomic bomb, with what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate 
gap. By 1949, four years later, the ~-~siens began to close that gap with 
their first atomic test . In 1952, we opened what vre believed was the 
decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the first explosion of the immensely 
more powerful hydrogen bomb. And by 1953, nine months later, that gap 
too began to close in a Soviet test of a similar type of weapon . 
So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, what has h~pened in 
all these years of unrestricted testing? Has the gap widened with the 
free rein which has been allowed to the scientific-industrial-military 
complex? Have we gained the absolute advantage, the ul tima.te advantage 
which will guarantee the nation ' s security? The truth is that the gap 
has not widened. On the contrary, it has narrowed almost to the vanish-
ing point . It has narrowed both in terms of the basic knowledge of the 
sciences involved and in terms of the application of that knowl edge in 
military technology . 
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Once no nation, except ourselves, could have inflicted on any 
other, tens of millions of nuclear deaths in a matter of hours. Now, we 
ourselves, no less than others, are subject to a catastrophe of this 
magnitude. 
In short , the nation has not been made more secure in any real 
sense by this indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of security by nuclear 
development through almost two decades for the simple reason that others 
were also engaged in the same indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit . This 
furious and frantic race for superiority in the capacity to inflict nuclear 
devastation in mass o~ in caliperic refinement in the interests of national 
security in the end ha~rovided security to no ~ation. It has provided 
on~y the assurance that the prospect of irrmediate and massive destruction 
to others will be at least as great as that prospect is to ourselves . 
That is vitally important insurance in the kind of world in which we live 
but let us not delude ourselves as to the nature of the coverage. We have 
provided not security for the nation but only insurance that if our civili -
zation is~t to the nuclear torch by any hand, others will be consumed in 
the same stuoendous blaze. 
To cling to the belief that the continuance of indiscriminate 
testing is the margin which provides forfue security of this nation is to 
fly in the face of the reality of experience. It is not a scientific view. 
It is not even an understandable pride and faith in our own great scientific, 
technological and military capacities. It is a ~stic and egocentric belief 
which borders --and I choose the words carefully--on a most dangerous and 
tragic obsession . 
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~tr. President, this Treaty, in itself, is no answer to that 
obsession. This Treaty is but a slender strand of hope drawn painfully 
from the web of conflicting interests, hideous fears and fatuous and 
immature arrogances out of which are spun the relations of nations in 
our times. It is an evidence, slight and uncertain, but an evidence that 
there exists that capacity of courage and that '1-Till to life, which may 
yet bring to bear on this stifling entanglement, the quiet and simple 
power of human reason . 
Do not, Mr . President , look for miracles from this Treaty . 
There are none. Thjs nation, the Soviet Union and the world are destined 
to live for a lonR time with feet dan~?;ling over tl~~ grave that beckons to 
the human civili~ation which is our common heritage. A~ainst that immense 
void of darY~ess, this Treaty is a feeble candle. It is a flicker of 
light where there has been no light. 
The Senator from Montana Hill vote for this light and he '1-Till 
hope for its strengthening by subseguent acts of reason on all sides. 
He '~>!ill vote for ratification of this Trea~ beca.use it is, on clear 
balance, in the interests of the people of his state and the United States . 
He "rill vote for it because it is a testament to the universal vitality 
of reason. He will vote for it because it is an affirmation of human 
life itself . 
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